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Abstract 
Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? 
Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy and 
neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral 
actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilitarian 
impersonal moral actions (trolley dilemma). Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et 
al., 2001) have argued that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral 
dilemmas are more emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (taking more time 
to be rational) than impersonal moral dilemmas. Our novel findings show an effect of 
psychological accessibility (driven by partial contextual information; Kahneman, 
2003) on utilitarian moral behavior and response time for rational choices. Enhanced 
accessibility of utilitarian outcomes through comprehensive information about moral 
actions and consequences boosted utility maximization in moral choices, with 
rational choices taking less time. Moreover, our result suggests that previous results 
indicating emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, 
may have been artifacts of presenting partial information. 
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Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? ‘It is 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and 
wrong’. With these words, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1789) defined 
the nature of utilitarian actions: behaviors judged as morally right only by virtue of 
their outcome (Bentham, 1789). From the utilitarian point of view, Bentham (1789; 
1948) noted that is acceptable to sacrifice a small number of people’s lives to save a 
greater number because this results in greater utility (happiness) overall. In contrast, 
deontologists (e.g., Kant, 1785; 1959) have argued that it is not acceptable, because 
living is a fundamental right for everyone, and no one has the right to take that from 
anyone, regardless of any benefits that may arise from doing so. Research in 
psychology, experimental philosophy and neuropsychology has revealed that moral 
judgments of the appropriateness of life-saving actions are not strictly utilitarian, but 
are influenced by the type of involvement (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & 
Cohen, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Mikhail, 2007, 2009; Thomson, 1985). In 
particular, directly taking action (‘personal action’) in scenarios (one person pushing 
another from the bridge in order to save several others, in the ‘footbridge dilemma’) 
was judged to be less appropriate than indirectly taking action (‘impersonal action’) 
(a person ‘switching a mechanism’, killing one person in order to save several 
others, in the ‘trolley dilemma’). 
Various theoretical attempts have been made to account for these behavioral 
differences in response to personal and impersonal dilemmas. Traditionally, moral- 
psychology theorists have focused on the role of emotional processes in moral 
judgments (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Nakamura, 2013; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). For instance, Greene and 
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colleagues (2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002) found that respondents spent more time 
judging the appropriateness of personal moral actions than of impersonal actions. 
This result seems puzzling and surprising from a strict utilitarian perspective, given 
that the two dilemma types offer identical utility. 
In an attempt to provide an account of the above result in terms of the relationship 
between implicit and explicit cognitive processes in moral judgments, Greene and 
colleagues (2001) proposed a dual-process theory of moral behavior, stating that 
moral judgments can be driven via both (i) implicit, fast, affective and (ii) explicit, 
slow, controlled psychological mechanisms (Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Greene et al., 
2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen, 2004; 
Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008). In Greene’s view, the affective system is likely to be 
activated by ‘personal’ moral considerations, while the cognitive system might favor 
utilitarian consequences and thus rational thinking. This proposal has been 
supported by behavioral experiments (Greene et al., 2001), testing utilitarian choices 
in a morally challenging situation, in which a trolley is riding a rail and - if it proceeds 
on its way - five people tied on the track will be killed. The participants were 
presented with two different opportunities: in the trolley dilemma, to hit a switch and 
make the trolley change its track, killing one person tied to another rail, or to do 
nothing and let the five people die; similarly, in the footbridge dilemma, to push a 
person off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the 
trolley, saving the five people tied up onto the track, or to do nothing and let the five 
people die. The results show that people judge as appropriate sacrificing one person 
for the sake of five in the trolley dilemma, but judge as inappropriate sacrificing one 
person in order to save five in the footbridge dilemma.  
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According to the moral dual-process model, what makes the difference between 
the two types of dilemma is the degree of personal affective and cognitive 
involvement. Consistent with this model, participants took longer to accept (i.e. judge 
as appropriate) personal moral actions that would maximize utilitarian outcomes 
(rational moral judgments) than to reject such actions as inappropriate (irrational 
moral judgments) (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Greene and 
colleagues (2001) argued that when participants faced personal (footbridge-like) 
dilemmas in which one’s moral rules conflict with the outcomes, both affective and 
cognitive systems were recruited. The former would favor rejecting the actions, for 
the sake of an internal moral principle; the latter would favor endorsing them, in the 
name of rationality. The conflict, then, between the two systems would result in 
increased response time when a participant faced a footbridge-like dilemma and 
made a rational judgment. 
Crucially, almost all experimental studies based on Thomson’s (1985) paradigm 
have tended to use abstract moral dilemmas, framed in such way that limits the 
accessibility (Kahneman, 2003) of moral utilitarian actions and consequences, 
asking respondents to apparently put themselves into those cognitively challenging 
situations.  
For example: 
“…The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger 
off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the 
trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved.” 
 
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save 
the five workmen?  
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YES/NO” 
There are two striking issues in these commonly used descriptions of abstract 
moral dilemmas. First, although there is an explicit contextual account about the 
moral action and utilitarian consequences of saving the five workmen at the expense 
of the stranger, there is no corresponding account of saving the life of the stranger at 
the expense of the workmen. Hence, only 50% of the moral scenario is contextually 
available – a framing effect (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), where 
different representations of outcomes make some features of the situation more 
accessible and others less accessible, leading to systematically different decisions. 
Second, the appropriateness question itself further adds to this framing effect by 
requiring an assessment of appropriateness on only one of the two possible moral 
actions (“Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to 
save the five workmen”). Given the well-established role of contextual framing effects 
in decision-making (FeldmanHall, Mobbs, Evans, Hiscox, Navrady, & Dalgleish, 
2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), findings and interpretation of utilitarian moral 
decision-making based on these commonly used scenarios are to be treated with 
caution. 
For the current study, in an attempt to increase the accessibility of moral utilitarian 
actions and consequences – utilitarian accessibility – we have developed and de-
biased abstract moral scenarios and questions used by researchers in psychology, 
experimental philosophy and neuroscience.  
For example: 
“….The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push the lone 
workman off the bridge and onto the track below where his large body will 
stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if you do this, but the five workmen 
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will be saved. The only way to save the life of the lone workman is not to push 
this workman off the bridge. The five workmen will die if you do this, but the 
lone workman will be saved. 
 
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you: 
Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen 
or 
Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman” 
 
First, we offer a new experimental approach to study moral dilemmas by 
eliminating confounding variables (see, e.g., McGuire et al., 2009), allowing the 
footbridge dilemma to be impersonal (switching mechanism) and for the trolley 
dilemma to be personal (to push the worker on the track). Second, to account for 
utilitarian accessibility we offer presentations of moral dilemmas by using both partial 
textual descriptions (commonly employed in utilitarian moral research) and novel full 
textual descriptions of moral actions and their consequences. Third, we further 
reduce differences in utilitarian accessibility by offering a choice question of 
appropriateness, which accounts for both utilitarian alternatives (and their 
consequences) in moral actions (rational and irrational choice). 
 The results of the current study were expected to echo Green et al.’s (2001), 
with longer response time to personal dilemmas compared to impersonal ones, only 
when partial descriptions and a single appropriateness question were presented. In 
contrast, no differences in response time were expected between the dilemma types 
when full descriptions and a choice question were provided. 
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Experiment 
Method 
Participants. 
According to power analysis with a significance level = .05, desired power = .80 
and medium effect size (f2 = .25), a total sample size of 136 was required. 
Participants were recruited through a recruitment service of online survey panels.  A 
window of seven days was set for data collection; after a week had passed, 299 
people (170 females, 129 males) had taken part, meeting the required sample size. 
Mean age was 49 years (SD = 14.07). They took part individually and received a 
payment of £1. All participants were treated in accordance with the ethical standards 
of the British Psychological Society. 
Materials and Design. 
Each participant was given one of eight vignettes to read, involving a moral-
dilemma scenario where the type of dilemma, action involvement, task instructions 
and questions were manipulated. The experiment accounted for utilitarian 
accessibility by presenting descriptive information about the moral dilemmas: (1) by 
partial text description and question only (Greene et al., 2001) or (2) by full textual 
description and question, revealing all of the possible behavioral actions and 
consequences of the actions (see the supplemental materials).  
An independent measures 2×2×2 design was employed, with independent 
variables type of dilemma (trolley dilemma or footbridge dilemma), action 
involvement (moral personal or moral impersonal), and utilitarian accessibility (partial 
text description and question or full text description and question [displayed 
information about the initial state, action, and consequences of the action]). The 
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dependent variables were the choice of appropriateness of action (making a rational 
or irrational choice), study time (reading the scenarios), and response time. Based 
on the consequentialist theory of moral utilitarian judgment, in this experiment we 
defined a rational choice as one that saves the lives of five workmen rather than of 
another single workman, thereby maximizing the utility of the moral action that is 
taken and minimizing the disutility. The order of the response options (rational and 
irrational) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure. 
Instructions, scenario and question were presented in an online computer-based 
experiment. Participants were required to read the instructions and one moral-
dilemma scenario. Then (after clicking the ‘next’ button) they had to choose the more 
appropriate option for them (binary choice between actions with rational or irrational 
consequences).  
Results. 
The effect of the independent variables on choice1 was analyzed. Rational 
choices (choosing the option resulting in one death rather than five) were more 
commonly made when full information was presented and when an impersonal 
dilemma presented (Table 1): a logistic-regression model comprising all the main 
effects and interaction effects explained 38% of variance, RCS2 = .38. The main 
effects of accessibility (partial information vs full information), OR = 31.67, CI.95 = 
[3.95; 254.08], and involvement (impersonal vs personal), OR = 0.09, CI.95 = [0.03; 
0.31], were significant, but neither the main effect of dilemma type nor any of the 
interaction effects were. The odds of a rational choice were 31.67 times larger when 
a dilemma was presented with full information than when it was presented with 
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reduced information. Furthermore, the odds of a rational choice were 0.09 times 
smaller when a dilemma involved a choice of a personal act (pushing the person) 
than when it involved an impersonal act (operating a switch without direct contact 
with the person).  
Study time for a dilemma with full information was longer than when partial 
information was displayed; furthermore, when involvement was impersonal, time was 
longer than when it was personal (Table 2). A 2×2×2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
showed that the main effects of accessibility (partial vs full information), F(1, 291) = 
13.31, p < .001, ε2 = .04, and involvement (impersonal vs personal), F(1, 291) = 
5.33, p < .05, ε2 = .01, were significant.  
In contrast, response time for a dilemma with full information was shorter than 
when partial information was displayed (Table 3). A 2×2×2 ANOVA showed that the 
main effect of accessibility (partial vs full information), F(1, 291) = 30.89, p < .001, ε2 
= .09, was significant. Further analysis examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) 
claim that ‘emotional interference’ produces longer response time for emotionally 
incongruent responses. Specifically, the dual-process theory of moral behavior 
(Greene et al., 2001) predicts longer response time for a rational choice in response 
to a moral dilemma under the condition of personal involvement than for a rational 
choice under the condition of impersonal involvement. However, descriptives 
indicated that response time was longer for emotionally incongruent response only 
under the conditions of partial information, employed by Greene and colleagues 
(Figure 1). In support, we conducted 2×2×2×2 ANOVA, with choice rationality 
(response to the task) as an additional independent variable. The results show that 
the main effect of accessibility, F(1, 283) = 8.59, p < .01, ε2 = .02, and the interaction 
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effects of involvement by accessibility, F(1, 283) = 5.48, p < .05, ε2 = .01, 
involvement by choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 14.43, p < .001, ε2 = .04, and 
accessibility by choice rationality (rational vs irrational choice), F(1, 283) = 6.72, p < 
.05, ε2 = .02, were significant. 
Follow-up simple-effect tests showed that for moral dilemmas with partial 
information, the interaction between involvement and choice rationality was 
significant, F(1, 159) = 15.60, p < .001, ε2 = .09. Unsurprisingly, further simple effects 
within partial information revealed that the effect of choice rationality was significant, 
F(1, 82) = 8.69, p < .01, ε2 = .09, when involvement was personal, with rational 
choices taking more time to make (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 2.81; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .38) than irrational (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 
2.16; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .61); however, when involvement was impersonal, the effect was 
significant, F(1, 76) = 8.56, p < .01, ε2 = .09, with rational choices taking less time 
(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 2.03; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .52) than irrational (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 2.51; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .84). 
Yet, simple effects showed that for moral dilemmas with full information only the 
effect of choice rationality was significant, F(1, 138) = 10.69, p < .01, ε2 = .06, with 
rational choices taking less time (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1.79; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .49) than irrational (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 2.19; 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = .46). These findings suggest that any emotional interference, with rational 
choices taking more time to make, appears as an artifact of presenting partial 
information and disappears when full information is presented, with rational choices 
taking less time. 
Discussion 
Our results reveal that variation in utilitarian accessibility produces variation in 
moral choices. In particular, displaying full information regarding moral actions and 
11 
 
Utilitarian Accessibility in Moral Judgments  
 
consequences resulted in an increase of rational choices. Moreover, the effect of 
utilitarian accessibility was general in that it occurred across types of involvement 
(both personal and impersonal) and types of dilemma (both trolley and footbridge). 
Previous research (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) found that judges took more time to 
judge an action as rational when a moral dilemma was personal. However, type of 
dilemma and involvement were confounded (McGuire et al., 2009), and utilitarian 
accessibility was not manipulated. Accordingly, our results show that response time 
for a dilemma with full information was shorter than when partial information was 
displayed. However, neither the main effects of the manipulated variables 
involvement and dilemma, nor the interaction effects influenced response time. 
We further examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) claim that ‘emotional 
interference’ produces longer response time for emotionally incongruent responses. 
This prediction was only confirmed when participants make a rational choice in 
response to a moral dilemma under the condition of personal involvement (e.g., 
judging it appropriate to push the man off the footbridge in the footbridge dilemma) 
under conditions of partial information. In contrast, with full information presented, 
rational choices were made faster. Therefore, our results suggest that any emotional 
interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, is an artifact of 
presenting partial information and does not happen when full information is 
presented, with rational choices taking less time. Given our results, a more plausible 
interpretation of increased response time with rational answers under conditions of 
partial information is reduced utilitarian accessibility rather than ‘emotional 
interference’. When decision-makers are presented with full contextual information 
about a particular moral action and its consequences, the framing effect will be 
eliminated and mental simulation will not entertain other possible outcomes of the 
12 
 
Utilitarian Accessibility in Moral Judgments  
 
scenario (e.g., FeldmanHall et al., 2012). Therefore, decision-makers are more 
vividly confronted with the effect of the action (whether personal or impersonal). It is 
plausible that limited utilitarian accessibility of moral actions and consequences 
results in a psychological uncertainty and corresponding mental simulations 
(compensating for reduced accessibility of moral actions and consequences). In 
contrast, comprehensive information about moral actions and consequences may 
eliminate uncertainty, and boost utility maximization in moral choices, with rational 
choices taking less time. Such an interpretation might be accommodated by 
‘situation models’ (e.g., Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987), in which linguistic 
descriptions are understood by simulating perceptual and motor aspects of those 
descriptions. There is empirical support for this simulation view that also 
demonstrates that switching between simulations takes time both when switching 
perceptual modality (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003) and semantic 
interpretation (Ferguson, Tresh, & Leblond, 2013). 
Our main finding is the effect of utilitarian accessibility on judgment of 
appropriateness and response time. Therefore, we agree with McGuire et al.’s 
(2009) recommendation that “More research needs to be done at a behavioral level 
in order to fine-tune the questions being asked before work identifying the neural 
correlates of moral decision-making can be useful” (p. 580).  
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Footnote 
1  Irrational choice was the reference category and rational choice as the response 
category. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 
Choice as a function of involvement, accessibility and dilemma type 
    Trolley Footbridge 
 Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Irrational Rational Irrational Rational 
 Impersonal Partial 6% 7% 8% 5% 
 
  
(19) (21) (23) (14) 
 
 
Full 0% 12% 2% 9% 
 
  
(1) (35) (6) (28) 
 Personal Partial 13% 1% 12% 1% 
 
  
(39) (4) (36) (4) 
 
 
Full 2% 10% 4% 8% 
     (5) (29) (11) (24) 
 Note.  Figures are percentages with frequencies in brackets. 
  
 
Table 2 
Descriptives for study time by involvement, accessibility and dilemma type 
Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Tr M SD M SD 
  Impersonal Partial T 3.23 0.50 3.29 0.60 
  
  
U 28.43 14.27 31.38 17.28 
  
 
Full T 3.40 0.53 3.43 0.54 
  
  
U 34.55 20.65 36.46 27.16 
  Personal Partial T 3.12 0.44 3.15 0.46 
  
  
U 21.63 8.74 25.56 9.85 
    Full T 3.36 0.47 3.35 0.50 
      U 30.01 12.49 32.10 16.86 
  Note.  The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this was 
considerably improved by logarithmic transformation. 
Tr: transformation.  T: logarithmically transformed.  U: untransformed (original). 
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Table 3 
Descriptives for response time by involvement, accessibility and dilemma type 
      Trolley Footbridge 
  Involvement Accessibility 
(information) 
Tr M SD M SD 
  Impersonal Partial T 2.28 0.74 2.30 0.76 
  
  
U 13.43 13.88 13.15 9.57 
  
 
Full T 1.85 0.52 1.89 0.54 
  
  
U 7.25 3.92 7.62 4.14 
  Personal Partial T 2.16 0.60 2.29 0.63 
  
  
U 10.51 7.25 12.19 8.76 
    Full T 1.85 0.50 1.86 0.50 
      U 7.15 3.53 7.25 3.48 
  
 
Note.  The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this was 
considerably improved by logarithmic transformation. 
Tr: transformation.  T: logarithmically transformed.  U: untransformed (original). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Mean response time as a function of accessibility, involvement, and choice 
rationality (time in seconds). 
21 
 
Accessibility in Moral Judgments 
 
Figure 1. 
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